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1. SUMMARY: The issue in No. 81-1617 is whether the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits police from detaining luggage ...__ . ___.... __ _ 
reasonably suspected of containing narcotics for the purpose of 
~
arranging exposure to a narcotics detection dog. No. 81-1635 
is a cross-petn, in which the cross-petr argues that he 
personally--and not merely his luggage--was seized in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Cross-petr Place 
attracted the attention of narcotics detectives as he prepared 
to board a plane at a Miami airport. The detectives approached 
Place and asked him to show identification. He did so. The 
detectives did not detain him and Place boarded the plane for 
New York. After their investigation revealed that Place had 
listed false addresses on his luggage tags, the Miami 
detectives phoned agents in New York. Those agents then 
approached Place in New York. They did so based on both their 
own observations of his behavior and the information telephoned 
from Miami. After a short discussion, the detectives told 
Place that he was free to leave but that his luggage was being 
r--------~------
detained for exposure to a narcotics detection dog. At this 
point Place apparently made a bribe offier, which the police 
declined. Place left a phone number and departed. About two -
hours later a dog sniffed Place's luggage. Its response 
signalled the presence of drugs in one sui tease. With this 
information police phoned a magistrate, who issued a warrant 
3. 
authorizing a search. The luggage was found to contain LSD, 
cocaine, and marijuana. Place then was arrested. 
Contending that he and his luggage had been seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, Place moved for suppression 
of the evidence. The dist ct (Platt) denied the motion. The 
court found that at "reasonable suspicion" supported the 
encounters both in Miami and in New York. (In a footnote the 
dist ct suggeted that there was "probable cause" to detain 
Place and his luggage in New York.) Place had been detained 
only briefly for the kind of investigation countenanced by 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1 (1968). Further, the court found 
that "reasonable suspicion" justified detention of the luggage 
for sniffing by the narcotics detection dog. Place was allowed 
to leave. The Fourth Amendment did not apply equally to 
persons and to inanimate objects. 
A divided~A2 reversed. CA2 did not consider the issue 
raised in the cross-petition--whether Place personally was 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment or whether he was 
only detained in a permissible Terry stop. Focussing on the 
seizure of Place's luggage, Judge Mansfield's majority opinion 
\ fo~nd that there was no distinction between the standard for 
I se1zure of persons and of possessions. Assuming the existence 
of "reasonable suspicion" that Place was carrying narcotics, 
there still was not probable cause. And without probable cause _________..____ 
detention of Place's luggage for two hours could not be 
justified. In so holding CA2 distinguished cases in which 
4. 
other CAs have upheld detention of luggage for dog-sniffing on 
the basis of "reasonable suspicion." See United States v. 
Viegas, 639 F.2d 42 (CAl 1981), cert denied, No. 80-1344 (May 
4, 1981); United States v. West, 651 F.2d 71 (CAl 1981), pet 
for cert pending, No. 81-307 (currently being held for No. 80-
2146, Florida v. Roye9 ; United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22 
(CA7 1980); and United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356 (CA9 
1981). According to Judge Mansfield, the detention in each of 
these cases had been much more limited than the two hours 
involved in this case. Judge Mansfield also distinguished the 
case principally relied on by the other CAs, United States v. 
Van Leeuwen, 397 u.s. 249 (1970). In Van Leeuwen this Court 
upheld a one-day detention of two packages arousing the 
suspicion of postal officials; information discovered during 
that period then was used to obtain a search warrant. The 
central difference, according to Judge Mansfield, was that the 
owner of the parcels in Van Leeuwen had deposited the parcels 
with the post office, "thereby voluntarily relinquishing 
custody and control over then for an indefinite period." App. 
20a. And the Court in Van Leeuwen carefully limited its 
holding to the facts of the case. 397 u.s., at 252-253. 
Judge Oakes concurred in Judge Mansfield's opinion. He 
wrote separately to emphasize his view that the Fourth 
Amendment should be read "not atomistically, but regulatorily." 
He would approve "sidestepping" the probable casue requirement 




search was conducted pursuant to clear rules adopted by the 
appropriate government authority. 
Judge Kaufman dissented. He regarded the stops of Place 
as permissible under Terry. As to the detention of the 
luggage, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable 
seizures. And here the reasonable suspicion of the detaining 
officers, viewed in a balance with the government interest in 
stopping drug traffic and the less than two hour duration of 
the detention, rendered the detention reasonable. Place's 
legitimate privacy interest was protected adequately by the 
subsequent issuance of a warrant before the luggage was 
searched. Van Leeuwen was the governing authority. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petitioning in No. 81-1617, the SG 
argues that CA2's decision conflicts with decisions of CAs 1, 
7, and 9, supra, and with Van Leeuwen, supra. These courts 
have reasoned--in clear contrast with CA2--that "Terry and 
Dunaway and their progeny relate to the detention of people, 
not inanimate objects." Viegas, supra, 654 F.2d, at 1359. Nor 
can the cases be distinguished on the basis of the duration of 
the detention in the different cases. The record in Klein is 
unclear as to the length of the detention~ the detention in 
West was for about an hour, compared with less than two hours 
here. And though the publised opinion in Viegas is silent, the 
Brief in Opposition to cert in that case, No. 80-1344, at 3, 
indicates that the agents there were informed that no dog would 
be available for four hours. 
6. 
Respondent summarily repeats the reasoning of the CA2 
majority. The cases are fact-specific; hence there is no 
conflict. And the Fourth Amendment generally does not 
establish different standards of reasonableness for the 
detention of persons and of objects. Van Leeuwen was limited 
to its facts by this Court's own opinion. 
In the cross-petn, No. 81-1835, Place argues that Fourth 
Amendment rights are violated whenver a person is stopped for 
questioning solely on the basis of certain "profile 
characteristics." 
The SG responds that this issue is not properly presented. 
Any question here is inherently fact-bound, as the enforcement 
officials relied on factors beyond "profile" characteristics. 
Moreover, this question was not addressed by CA2. If CA2 Is 
judgment is reversed, the CA should have the first opportunity 
to consider this question. Additionally, as argued in the SG's 
amicus brief in No. 80-2146, Florida v. Royer, every "stop" is 
not a "seizure." And even if a seizure did occur here, the 
dist ct cited a number of specific facts establishing a 
"reasonable suspicion" that would justify a brief investigative 
stop. 
DISCUSSION: I agree with the SG that there is a 
clear split among the CAs on the standard required for 
detention of a sui tease for dog sniff. This issue also is 
presented in No. 81-307, West v. United States, which is being 





I think it is clear that the Court could Grant this case 
and decide the important issue argued: Whether "reasonable 
suspicion" will suffice to justify a detention of luggage 
pending a dog-sniff. ___ Because of the importance of this 
question, I recommend a Grant. 
It appears, however, that the same issue could have been 
reached in West, supra, which the Court instead held for Royer. 
I think it most unlikely that Royer could affect this case. 
But it is not impossible. Because of the Court's disposition 
of West, it may be worthwhile here to discuss the relationship 
of this case to Royer. 
Royer--like this Court's previous decision in United 
States v. Mendenahll, 446 u.s. 544 (1980)--principally involves 
the validity of a defendant's consent to a search. There are 
at least two potential issues. First, was there a "seizure" of 
the person of the kind that might constitute an illegal arrest 
if not justified under the appropriate Fourther Amendment 
standard? the subsequent consent to search might be 
however, comes the question whether the 
Amendment standard--presumably probable 





Court reached the second issue and decided that certain "drug 
courier profile" 
probable cause. 
characteristics were strongly indicative of 
Although CA2 found no probable cause in the 
current petn, the dist court, in a footnote, App. 57a, appears 
to have held that there was probable cause for the detention in 
8. 
New York. The Government has not argued either in CA2 or in 
this Court that probable cause existed. But, should Royer be 
decided in this way, I suppose the case could be GVR 1 ed for CA2 
to reconsider the probable cause question. As stated earlier, 
I regard this possibility as probably too remote to call for a 
hold. But the likelihood of West 1 s being affected may be 
equally remote. 
Overall, I would recommend a Grant in No. 81-1617. 
The issue raised by the cross-petition, No. 81-1835, is 
whether "profile characteristics" are sufficient to warrant 
even a Terry-type stop under the Fourth Amendment. This 
question would arise in this case only if the Court granted the 
main petition; otherwise there would be an independent basis 
for suppressing the evidence under the CA2 holding. Whatever 
the Court does with the main petition, for the reasons cited by 
the SG there is no reason for the Court to consider this 
question in the current posture of the case. CA2 has not 
decided whether Place 1 s rights were violated in this regard. 
If this Court reversed on the issue in the main petition, Place 
could still raise this defense in the lower courts. 
Accordingly, I think that the Court simply could deny the 
cross-petn. There is also a possibility, however, that this 
question could be affected by the decision in No. 80-2146, 
Florida v. Royer. If the Court grants the main petition, it 
therefore might wish to consider holding the cross-petn either 




There are responses to both the petn and the cross-petn. 
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On Friday, August 17, 1979, resp attracted police atten-
tion at Miami International Airport. Soon after he entered the 
airport, officers noticed that he was scanning the terminal area 
and seemed to be very nervous. After standing in line at the 
National Airlines ticket counter for 20 minutes, he purchased a 
ticket on the 12:40 flight to LaGuardia Airport in New York with 
cash, and checked his two sui teases. The luggage tags on the 
sui teases bore resp' s true name and a street address on South 
Ocean Drive in Hallandale, Florida. The street numbers, however, 
differed slightly: 1885 on one bag and 1865 on the other. 
After resp passed through the airline security check-
point, two officers approached him and asked to see his ticket 
and some identification. Resp produced his ticket and a New Jer-
sey driver's license, both of which properly identified him. The 
officers asked permission to search his suitcases, and he con-
sented. Since it was then 12:35, five minutes before flight 
time, they decided not to conduct the search. As they parted, 
resp stated that he had recognized them as policemen when he had 
first seen them in the lobby. 
This parting taunt apparently angered the officers, for 
they immediately resumed their investigation. They obtained the 
callback number on resp' s reservation from National Airlines. 
This number was assigned to 1980 South Ocean Drive in Hallandale. 
The Hallandale police reported (incorrectly, it was later discov-
ered) that neither 1885 nor 1865 South Ocean Drive (the addresses 
.. 
on the luggage tags) existed. The Miami officers telephoned DEA 
agents in New York and passed on the information they had discov-
ered. 
When resp' s plane arrived at LaGuardia, some two and 
one-half hours later, two DEA agents were waiting for him. After 
observing his nervous behavior and allowing him to reclaim his 
suitcases, the agents approached resp and identified themselves. 
They asked permission to search his luggage, but he declined, 
claiming that it already had been searched in Miami. At this 
-------------' ---- I 
point the agents seized the suitcases and told resp that they 
would be held until a federal judge had determined whether there 
was probable cause to issue a search warrant. (One agent also 
took resp' s driver's 1 icense and ran a computer check for any 
violations.) 
Resp 
Resp was told that he was free to go, but that he 
~
The agents did not tell him how 
long they planned to hold the luggage, but one of them gave resp 
a piece of paper listing his name and telephone numbers where he 
could "be reached by your attorney or yourself to pick up this 
luggage." J.A. 9. 
By then it was about 4:00 o'clock Friday afternoon. The 
agents took the sui teases to their car and left LaGuardia at 
about 4:10. Rather than taking the suitcases to the district 
court, as they had told resp they would, they drove to Kennedy 
Airport, where they arrived some 35 minutes later. At about 5:30 
or 5:40, a trained "sniffer dog" reacted positively to the small-_..-- ---. 
er bag, indicating that there was a controlled substance inside . 
The agents therefore contacted the u.s. Attorney's Office (EDNY) 
for instructions and were told to apply for a warrant on Monday 
morning. 
weekend. ---
They secured the sui teases in their office over the 
On Monday afternoon a federal magistrate (Caden) issued 
a warrant for the smaller bag. On opening it, the agents discov-
ered over a kilogram of cocaine. Resp was indicted under 21 
u.s.c. §84l(a) (1) (possessing cocaine with intent to distribute 
it) . 
B. Decisions Below 
Resp's motion to suppress the cocaine discovered in the 
sui tease was denied by the DC (EDNY; Platt) . The DC concluded J c:_ 
that resp's behavior created a reasonable suspicion that he was 
carrying narcotics, and this reasonable suspicion justified the 
stop that occurred at LaGuardia when the DEA agents took resp's 
license and suitcases. On the basis of United States v. Klein, 
626 F.2d 22 (CA7 1980), the DC upheld the detention of the lug-
gage, too. Even if reasonable suspicion is inadequate to justify 
a seizure, the DC noted (without explanation) that the agents had 
probable cause to detain the bags here. 
On appeal, CA2 (Mansfield [majority], Oakes [concur]; (/I L 
Kaufman [dissent]) reversed. Judge Mansfield, writing the major-
ity opinion, found it "clear that the drug enforcement agents did 
not have probable cause to arrest Place or seize his baggage at 
LaGuardia Airport," petn app lla, but was willing to assume that 
they had reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop, 
Judge Mansfield was also willing to assume that the 
1 (1968), apply to seizures 
of property, despite arguments that the Terry exception to the --------Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement should not be so 
expanded. Petn app 15a. Even with these assumptions, however, 
the police were only entitled to detain the suitcases for a rea-
----------~ - --
sonable period. Judge Mansfield concluded that the detention 
here went well beyond the narrow exception sanctioned by Terry. 
He relied on the excessive length of time that the luggage was 
held, "the high-handed procedure adopted by the agents," the fact 
that the agents lied to resp about what the agents would do with 
the suitcases, and the fact that such extreme measures were un-
justified by the circumstances of the case. 
Judge Mansfield distinguished United States v. Van 
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), in which the owner of two parcels 
voluntarily relinquished custody and control over the parcels 
"for the indefinite period (at least a couple of days) required 
for forwarding and delivery." Petn app 20a. Judge Mansfield 
also distinguished decisions in other CAs where the detention of 
a suspect's luggage had been reasonable--in sharp contrast to the 
present case. Id., at 2la. 
Judge Oakes concurred in Judge Mansfield's opinion, thus 
giving Judge Mansfield majority support, but wrote separately to 
emphasize his own Fourth Amendment views. He argued "that the 
Fourth Amendment should be read not atomistically, but 
regulatorily." Id., at 22a. Warrantless seizures on less than 
probable cause should be permissible only when conducted "pursu-
ant to duly adopted, proper, nondi scr imina tory, and reasonable 
rules or regulations adopted by the appropriate governmental au-
thority and subjected to appropriate judicial review." Ibid. 
Judge Kaufman dissented. In his view, the seizure of 
the luggage was reasonable. He seems to argue that the seizure 
was justified by the later discovery of the cocaine, id., at 25a, 
by the exigent circumstances, ibid., by the fact that resp could 
have avoided any inconvenience merely by waiving his Fourth 
Amendment rights, id., at 26a, and by the fact that the seizure 
of the suitcases did not violate resp's privacy interest in their 
contents, id., at 26a-27a. He found Judge Mansfield's distinc-
tions between Van Leeuwen and the present case to be "nebulous" 
and unpersuasive. Id., at 27a. 
II. Discussion 
I fear that the Court has again taken a case to decide 
an important issue which is not well presented by the case. Here 
the SG claims that the question presented is "[w] hether the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits police from temporarily detaining per-
sonal luggage reasonably suspected of containing narcotics for 
the purpose of arranging its exposure to a trained narcotics de-
teet ion dog." Brief for the United States i. That question, 
however, was neither addressed nor decided by CA2. Judge Mans-
field assumed that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a rea-
sonable detention of luggage reasonably suspected of containing 
narcotics for the purpose of exposing it to a sniffer dog. It 
was only after making this assumption that he found the detention 
here to be unreasonable. It thus appears that this case will end 
up being much like Florida v. Royer, No. 80-2146: the Court will 
give important guidance to police on what they are allowed to do 
in airports, but technically the guidance will be dicta. 
A. The Permissible Police Options 
The first inquiry should focus on the options that are 
legitimately available to police who desire to discover the con-
tents of a closed container in which a suspect has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. What steps may police take, and what do 
they need to support their actions? 
(1) Probable Cause. I begin with the easy case. If the 
-police have both (i) probable cause to believe that there is con-~ 
traband or other evidence of a crime inside a closed container,~ ......._, 
and (ii) a valid warrant describing that container, then there 
should be no problem with the Fourth Amendment. The police may 
seize the container and conduct the search immediately. 
If the police have probable cause, but no warra~ they 
may not search the container immediately. Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 u.s. 753 (1979) ~ United States v.vChadwick, 433 u.s. 1 
(1977). If the exigencies of the circumstances demand it, howev-
er, they are entitled to seize the container and secure it pend-
ing a decision on their request for a warrant. In Sanders, for 
example, the police "had ample probable cause to believe that 
respondent's green suitcase contained marihuana." 442 U.S., at 
761. But it was being taken away from the airport in a taxi, so 
if the police did not seize it immediately they were likely to 
lose it entirely. Although they had no right to search the suit-
case without a warrant, you declared that " [ t] he pol ice acted 
properly--indeed commendably--in apprehending [resp' s] lug-
gage," ibid. Dicta in Chadwick similarly endorsed the seizure of 
a footlocker there. 433 u.s., at 13, 15-16. Again the seizure 
was based on probable cause, and justified by the fact that the 
suspects were about to drive away with the evidence. 
(2) Reasonable Suspicion. The general rule is that 
searches and seizures subject to the Fourth Amendment require a 
warrant supported by probable cause. There are "a few 'jealously 
and carefully drawn' exceptions" to this general rule, Arkansas 
v. Sanders, 442 u.s., at 759 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 
U.S. 493, 499 (1958)) (footnote omitted), such as the one recog-
nized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
~ant principles in San~~ 
You explained the 
[B] ecause each exception to the warrant requirement 
invariably impinges to some extent on the protective 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the few situations in 
which a search may be conducted in the absence of a 
warrant have been carefully delineated and "the burden 
is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for 
it." United States v. Jeffers, 342 u.s. 48, 51 
(1951) •... Moreover, we have limited the reach of each 
exemption to that which is necessary to accommodate the 
identified needs of society. 
442 U.S., at 759-760. Most of the "few 'jealously and carefully 
drawn' exceptions" permit the police to dispense with a warrant, 
but still require the existence of probable cause. For present 
purposes, the most relevant exception is that recognized by Terry 
-and its progeny, which allow a warrantless seizure of a person on 
less than probable cause. This Court has never recognized a war-
rantless seizure of property on less than probable cause. 1 The 
issue, therefore, is whether the Court should create a new excep-
tion along Terry lines to permit property seizures. 
There are good arguments why there should not be a prop-
erty seizure exception. Historically, seizures based on less 
than probable cause were one of the principal targets of the 
Fourth Amendment, 2 and it could be considered contrary to the 
Amendment's purposes to create a seizure exception. It has also 
been argued that property seizures cannot be justified by the 
Terry rationale, for there are no differences in degree: "an own-
er is either dispossed of his property or it remains in his cus-
tody." Comment, Seizing Luggage on Less than Probable Cause, 18 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 637, 645 (1981). 
On balance, I am unconvinced by these arguments. I con-
elude that there should be a narrow exception to the Fourth 
( 1The closest case is United States v 
249 (1970). There two suspicious package 
post office. Rather than forwarding the · tely to their 
destinations, the post office delayed their delivery pending a 
decision on a search warrant. Since the suspect had voluntarily 
surrendered the packages to the post office, there was no seizure 
involved. The Court recognized that, in theory, "detent1on of 
mail could at some point become an unreasonable seizure •.. with-
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment," id., at 252, but held 
that no Fourth Amendment interest had been invaded "on the facts 
of this case," id., at 253. Since the case was decided, This 
Court has never cited Van Leeuwen for its holding. 
2The historical considerations are 
Amicus Brief at pp. 16-26. (In view 
brief, this is a brief you should read 
discussed in the ACLU' s 
of the weakness of resp's 
in any event.) 
Amendment's probable cause requirement to govern minimally intru-
sive property seizures. Although I agree with the Government's 
conclusion on this point, I find it a much harder question than 
the SG would make it. The conclusion does not follow directly 
from Terry, despite the SG's assertions to the contrary. The 
justification for detaining a person for an investigative stop 
does not necessarily entitle an officer to seize the suspect's 
luggage for the same period. If the officer has no reasonable 
suspicion relevant to the luggage itself, the suspect should be .--__ 
free to turn it over to a third party when that is a practical 
option. And given that the detention of a suspect does not nee-
essarily entitle an officer to detain the suspect's luggage, it 
does not always follow that detaining the luggage is the lesser 
intrusion. Nor is it always true that a seizure of a container 
is less intrusive than an impermissible search of that container. 
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (As between 
the search or seizure of an automobile, "which is the 'greater' 
and which the 'lesser' intrusion is itself a debatable question 
and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances."). Fi-
nally, there are distinctions between people and property that 
make a limited seizure of property less appropriate. As Judge 
Mansfield recognized, . a sui tease (unlike a per son) cannot inde-
.........._ ._,-'\ 
pendently resume its course after the police have finished with 
it. Petn app 15a. ~-----------------------------~ -----
Nevertheless, the Terry rationale is compelling here. 
~
Contrary to the argument made in the secondary literature, there 
are differences in degree among property seizures. The seizure 
may be brief or prolonged. The officer may hold the property in 
the suspect's presence, or remove it to a distant location. The 
seizure may come under circumstances to cause minimal inconve-
nience, or at a time that wrecks havoc with the suspect's plans. 
The item seized may be of minor importance, or essential to the 
suspect's life. All of these factors can be considered in decid-
ing whether a given seizure is so minimally intrusive that it may 
be justified by reasonable suspicion and the government's inter-
est in stemming the drug traffic. 
B. The Existence of Reasonable Suspicion 
I conclude that the DEA agents at LaGuardia had reason-__________________ '---____________ _ 
able suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop by the time 
~
they seized resp's suitcases, but once again the question is 
closer than the SG would have the Court believe. In Florida v. 
Royer, No. 80-2146, we agreed that the officers had reasonable 
suspicion when they learned that Royer was travelling under an 
alias. Here I do not think that the DEA a ents had comparable 
suspicion until resp lied to them about his suitcases having been ____, ' - ......._ 
searched in Miami. 
Before resp's lies, there was little real evidence sug-
gesting criminal activity except for resp's nervous behavior and 
scanning of the airport terminal, and that alone cannot be enough 
to establish reasonable suspicion. The discrepancy between the 
addresses on the baggage tags was minor, and it could easily be 
explained by the fact that resp was not from Hallendale. (His 
driver's license was issued by New Jersey.) The discrepancy be-
came particularly insignificant when the officers learned that 
resp had tagged his luggage with his true name. His paying for 
his flight in cash might have been suspicious (although there is 
no indication that the flight was very expensive, or that resp 
had a large roll of small bills) , but the cash payment lost what-
ever significance it had when the officers discovered that resp 
(i) had given a genuine callback number when making his reserva-
tion and (ii) had purchased his ticket under his true name. 3 
Other suspicious circumstances commonly found in drug 
courier profile cases were not present here. Resp was not trav-
elling without luggage (a factor deemed suspicious in United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 u.s., at 547 n.l), or with unusually 
heavy suitcases (a factor deemed suspicious in Royer), or with 
empty suitcases (a factor deemed suspicious in some lower court 
cases) • He was not a known drug dealer. In fact, a computer 
check of his license revealed no violations at all. 
Despite all this, I think the 1 ies resp told the New 
York DEA agents about his experience with the Miami pol icemen 
were enough to give them sufficient reasonable suspicion for a 
Terry stop. Coupled with his nervous behavior and scanning of 
the airport, they made it reasonably likely that he was trying to 
hide something. The lies also focused this suspicion on the 
3The only reason it is suspicious for a person to misidentify 
his luggage or to pay for a plane ticket with cash is because 
these actions indicate a desire to avoid having his ownership of 
the luggage or his identity discovered. When resp used his true .fl 
name for both the luggage tags and the flight reservation, how- ¥ 
ever, such a suspicion is no longer justified. 
suitcases. Under all of the circumstances, the agents were well 
short of probable cause, but they had a reasonable suspicion that 
resp was carrying contraband in his suitcases. 
C. The Reasonableness of the Seizure 
Although an exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable 
cause requirement is justified, it is justified only if the sei-
zure is minimally intrusive. The Court must remember that it is 
dealing with an exce~tion to a constitutional provision, and the 
~ ........-. 
exception should be narrowly drawn. 
(1) The SG' s General Arguments. The SG makes certain 
general arguments that would lead to an expansive exception for 
property seizures. For example, he contends that a property sei-
zure "may be of longer duration than a detention of the person 
because it entails a significantly lesser intrusion into personal 
liberty." Brief for the United States 11; see also id., at 23 
- / -----(" [T] he detention of baggage is significantly less intrus i"t7e-alan 
the detention of a person."). Although this generalization may 
be true for extended seizures, that is irrelevant here. It does 
not matter that a two-week property seizure is significantly less 
intrusive than a two-week arrest, or even that a two-hour proper-
ty seizure is significantly less intrusive than a two-hour ar-
rest, for it is clear that a person may not be seized for that 
~ long without probable cause. Dunaway v. New York, 442 u.s. 200 
(1979). It does the Government no good for the SG to argue that 





The relevant comparison is between a property seizure 
and the most intrusive seizure of a person that is permissible. 
The permissibility of a Terry stop, of course, varies according 
to the circumstances, but thus far the Court has endorsed only 
brief detentions. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 u.s. 692 (1981) 
(detention of home-owner while home searched pursuant to 
warrant); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (brief 
immigration check near bofder); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106 (1977) (order to leave car when car lawfully stopped and 
-
weapons frisk); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 
( 197 5) (investigative stop near border lasting less than a minute 
for "a brief question or two"); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972) (weapons frisk on basis of reasonable suspicion); Terry, 
supra (same). The American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-
Procedure would limit Terry stops to a maximum of 
Although twenty minutes is longer than any stop 
4If it was not already clear from Dunaway, it is certainly 
clear from Royer that the DEA agents could not have seized resp 
himself on the basis of reasonable suspicion and taken him from 
LaGuardia to Kennedy in order to carry out further investigation. 
5The ALI proposal provides: 
A law enforcement officer, lawfully present in any 
place, may [under certain circumstances] order a person 
to remain in the officer's presence near such place for 
such period as is reasonably necessary for the accom-
plishment of the purposes authorized [by the proposal], 
but in no case for more than twenty minutes. 
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §110. 2 (1) (1975). 
l 
that the Court has permitted, and the choice of twenty minutes 
has been criticized in the secondary literature for being exces-
sive,6 it can probably be viewed as a good approximation of the 
~ theoretical maximum. At this level, the SG's assertion is proba-
bly incorrect, for a twenty-minute property seizure is likely to 
be just as intrusive as a twenty-minute detention. In most cases 
a suspect will stay with the luggage for the twenty minutes to 
assure himself that nothing happens to it. In that case, there 
is no practical difference between the seizure of the luggage and 
the detention of the person. But even if the suspect does not 
stay with the luggage, he is effectively tied to the immediate 
vicinity so that he can reclaim it. The need to make special 
arrangements to recover a sui tease is probably more intrusive 
than simply staying with it for twenty minutes, at least in most 
cases. 
In sum, the comparison with Terry does not support an 
expansive exception. When a property seizure goes beyond what 
Terry would permit for a seizure of a person, it is no longer a 
7 minimal intrusion that may be justified on grounds of reasonable 
suspicion. 
The SG also argues that United States v. Van Leeuwen 
demonstrates that an extended property seizure is not unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment. This argument, however, ignores 
6E.g., Note, Field Interrogations: 
sponse, 49 J. Urb. L. 767, 776 (1972) 
take less than ten minutes) • 
Court Rule and Pol ice Re-
(most field interrogations 
' . 
the fact that Van Leeuwen arose in an entirely different 
context. 7 The "detention" in Van Leeuwen did not involve any 
seizure from a suspect, for the suspect had voluntarily surren-
dered custody of the packages to postal authorities. The suspect 
was not even aware of the detention until well after it was over. 
Had the warrant not been issued, it is not clear that the suspect 
would even have known that the detention had taken place, for 
mail often arrives a day or two later than a person might expect 
it. Judge Chambers, in CA9's Van Leeuwen decision, gave an apt 
summary of the situation: 
I think I am as sensitive as anyone to the Fourth 
Amendment in protecting one's person and one's home. 
But the detention of Van Leeuwen's "hot money" at the 
post office for 29 hours does not offend me very much. 
Someone in the post office holds up much of my mail 
over 29 hours. 
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 414 F.2d 758, 760 (CA9 1969) (Cham-
bers, J., concurring), rev'd on other grounds, 397 u.s. 249 
(1970). 
There are other distinctions that make Van Leeuwen less 
compelling than the SG contends. In Van Leeuwen, for example, 
the detention of the packages was unrelated to the finding of 
7of course Van Leeuwen would be relevant in a similar con-
text. For example, the Court might wish to indicate that DEA 
agents have considerably more leeway with respect to checked lug-
gage during the period after the passenger has surrendered it to 
the airline and before he has reclaimed it at the baggage claim 
area. So long as the luggage arrives at the claim area at about 
the same time it would have arrived without police interference, 
Van Leeuwen is relevant authority supporting a detention. 
J 
I 
probable cause. The police did not establish probable cause by 
investigating the packages, but by investigating the addressees. 
In its brief, the Government relied on the fact that it could 
have conducted the investigation in the same way without detain-
ing the packages. Brief for the United States in Van Leeuwen 6. 
This means that, under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 u.s. 471 
(1963), any problem with the detention would not have tainted the 
warrant. Accordingly, Van Leeuwen did not even challenge the 
initial detention, but rather challenged the lapse of time be-
tween the establishment of probable cause and the application for 
a search warrant. Brief for Resp in Van Leeuwen 19 ("this unrea-
sonable lapse of time after having probable cause violated the 
Fourth Amendment"). 
(2) The Facts Here. On the facts of the case here, I 
have no difficulty in concluding that the DEA agents went well 
beyond the minimal intrusion that could be justified on the basis 
of reasonable suspicion. The outrageousness of their behavior is 
highlighted by the fact that even Judge Mansfield8 condemned it. 
Resp's suitcases were seized from him at about 4:00 on a 
9tJ~ 
Friday afternoon. It was an hour and a half late r before the 
agents were able to expose the bags to a "sniffer dog" at a dif-
ferent location. If the dog had not detected drugs in the bags, 
8Judge Mansfield is not only a good judge, on criminal rna t-
ters he is easily the m~rvative of the g~d jugges on the 
Second Circuit. 
~it would have been at least two hours before resp could have re-
covered his luggage--and this requires several generous assump-
f 
tions. To recover them so quickly, we must assume that resp 
would have stayed in the Laguardia area, 9 thus severely restrict-
ing his movement. In view of the fact that resp was from New 
Jersey, and had already telephoned for a limousine, this would 
presumably have been a serious imposition. We would also have to 
assume that the agents would have returned the bags promptly once 
resp' s innocence was established, and there is no support for 
such an assumption in the record. It is noteworthy, for example, 
that the agents did not return the larger suitcase, as to which 
they did not have probable cause even after exposing it to the 
sniffer dog. All they did at the time of the arrest was give 
resp a telephone number to call to see about recovering his bags, 
?, 
with no suggestion as to when such a call would be appropriate or 
where resp would have to go or what he would have to do to regain 
) 
possess ion of his property. Under these circumstances, it is 
extraordinarily generous to the Government to speak of this case 
as involving merely a two hour seizure. 
If the Court is generous enough to treat this as a two 
hour seizure, there can still be little doubt that it goes far 
beyond anything the Court has permitted under Terry. (The Court 
9If resp had gone with the agents to Kennedy, of course, he 
would have been able to recover the bags sooner. If the resp is 
required to go with the agents to protect his right to recover 
his luggage, however, he has effectively been seized himself. 
Such a seizure is plainly impermissible. See note 4, supra. 
1 
has rejected less intrusive seizures in Royer and Dunaway.) Fur-
thermore, even if the Court were to ignore past precedents, this 
seizure should still be considered unreasonable. The only justi-
fication for dispensing with the probable cause requirement is 
the assumption that the seizure at issue is minimally intrusive. 
The police intrusion here, however, did far more than offend a 
person intent on asserting his Fourth Amendment rights. An inno-
cent traveller whose bags were detained without probable cause 
under these circumstances would be understandably furious. 10 
The SG claims to justify the seizure here on the basis 
of the Government's interest in controlling the drug traffic. 11 
That interest is, of course, compelling, and it is sufficient to 
justify a minimal intrusion on the basis of reasonable suspicion 
rather than probable cause. But in the absence of probable cause 
10The Government has argued that the Fourth Amendment standard 
should be based on what a reasonable person innocent of any 
wrongdoing would find objectionable. This Court has frequently 
rejected that standard. Numerous decisions recognize the right 
of an individual to protect his Fourth Amendment rights far more 
vigorously than a typical innocent bystander. See, e.g., 
Kolender v. Lawson, No. 81-1320. But even if the Court accepted 
this "general reasonableness" test, the conduct here would not 
satisfy it. Almost anyone would be furious if the pol ice took 
his luggage from him on a Friday afternoon and merely gave him a 
telephone number that he or his attorney could call to arrange to 
pick up the luggage himself at some unspecified time. Although 
that innocent person could avoid this inconvenience by consenting 
to a search, it is no answer to resp's argument to say that he 
could have waived his clear Fourth Amendment rights in order to 
avoid the violation of other Fourth Amendment rights. 
11The real governmental interest that the SG seeks to protect 
here is the DEA' s decision not to have a "sniffer dog" at 
LaGuardia Airport. And the only justification for that decision 
is the assertion that it would be uneconomical to keep a dog at 
LaGuardia. 
it is only sufficient to justify a minimally intrusive seizure of 
a suspect's luggage. A generalized interest in controlling the 
drug traffic (awful as that traffic is) does not justify an aban-
donment of all Fourth Amendment principles. In particular, it 
does not justify a two hour seizure of luggage on less than prob-
able cause--any more than it justified the less intrusive seizure 
in Florida v. Royer, No. 80-2146. 
III. Conclusion 
On the issue of general importance, the Court should 
recognize a new exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable 
cause requirement (along the lines of Terry) to permit a minimal-
ly intrusive seizure of a suspect's luggage when the police have 
a reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains contraband. On 
the fact-specific issue presented in this case, the Court should 
hold that the seizure at issue here went far beyond anything that 
was reasonably justifiable. 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1617 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
RAYMONDJ. PLACE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily 
detaining personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcot-
ics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the 
luggage contains narcotics. Given the strength of the public 
interest in detecting narcotics trafficking and the minimal in-
trusion that a properly limited detention would entail, we 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit such 
a. detention. On the facts of this case, however, we hold that 
the police conduct exceeded the bounds of a permissible in-
vestigative detention of the luggage. 
I 
Respondent Raymond J. Place's nervous behavior aroused 
the suspicions of law enforcement officers as he waited in line 
at the Miami International Airport to purchase a ticket to 
New York's LaGuardia Airport. As Place proceeded to the 
gate for his flight, the agents approached him and requested 
his airline ticket and some identification. Place complied 
with the request and consented to a search of the two suit-
cases he had checked. Because his flight was about to de-
part, however, the agents decided not to search the luggage. 
Prompted by Place's parting remark that he had recog-
~~~~a1-t~~, 
~ ~rr1- tr ~ 1 
~~~4->1~~~ 
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nized that they were police, the agents inspected the address 
tags on the checked luggage and noted discrepancies in the 
two street addresses. Further investigation revealed that 
neither address existed and that the telephone number Place 
had given the airline belonged to a third address on the same 
street. On the basis of their encounter with Place and this 
information, the Miami agents called Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) authorities in New York to relay their in-
formation about Place. 
Two DEA agents waited for Place at the arrival gate at 
LaGuardia Airport in New York. There again, his behavior 
aroused the suspicion of the agents. After he had claimed 
his two bags and called a limousine, the agents decided to ap-
proach him. They identified themselves as federal narcotics 
agents, to which Place responded that he knew they were 
"cops" and had spotted them as soon as he had deplaned. 
One of the agents informed Place that, based on their own ob-
servations and information obtained from the Miami authori-
ties, they believed that he might be carrying narcotics. 
After identifying the bags as belonging to him, Place stated 
that a number of police at the Miami Airport had surrounded 
him and searched his baggage. The agents responded that 
their information was to the contrary. The agents requested 
and received identification from Place-a New Jersey driv-
er's license, on which the agents later ran a computer check 
that disclosed no offenses, and his airline ticket receipt. 
When Place refused to consent to a search of his luggage, one 
of the agents told him that they were going to take the lug-
gage to a federal judge to try to obtain a search warrant and 
that Place was free to accompany them. Place declined, but 
obtained from one of the agents telephone numbers at which 
the agents could be reached. 
The agents then took the bags to Kennedy Airport, where 
they subjected the bags to a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics 
detection dog. The dog reacted positively to the smaller of 
the two bags but ambiguously to the larger bag. Approxi-
·' 
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mately 90 minutes had elapsed since the seizure of respond-
ent's luggage. Because it was late on a Friday afternoon, 
the agents retained the luggage until Monday morning, when 
they secured a search warrant from a magistrate for the 
smaller bag. Upon opening that bag, the agents discovered 
1, 125 grams of cocaine. 
Place was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). In the Dis-
trict Court, Place moved to suppress the contents of the lug-
gage seized from him at LaGuardia Airport, claiming that the 
warrantless seizure of the luggage violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights. 1 The District Court denied the motion. 
Applying the standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), to 
the detention of personal property, it concluded that deten-
tion of the bags could be justified if based on reasonable sus-
picion to believe that the bags contained narcotics. Finding 
reasonable suspicion, the District Court held that Place's 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by seizure of 
the bags by the DEA agents. 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1228 
1 In support of his motion, respondent also contended that the detention 
of his person at both the Miami and LaGuardia airports was not based on 
reasonable suspicion and that the "sniff test" of his luggage violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights. 498 F . Supp. 1217, 1221, 1228 (EDNY 1980). 
The District Court concluded that the agents had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that Place was engaged in criminal activity when he was detained 
at the two airports and that the stops were therefore lawful. !d., at 1225, 
1226. On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not reach this issue, assuming 
the existence of reasonable suspicion. Respondent Place cross-petitioned 
in this Court on the issue of reasonable suspicion, and we denied certiorari. 
457 U. S. -- (1982). We therefore have no occasion to address the issue 
here. 
We also note that respondent's challenge in the District Court to the 
"sniff test" was a challenge only to the manner in which the particular test 
was administered. 498 F. Supp., at 1226. Respondent did not raise, and 
we do not address, the question whether a sniff test by a trained narcotics 
detection dog constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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(EDNY 1980). Place pleaded guilty to the possession 
charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion 
to suppress. 
On appeal of the conviction, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed. 660 F. 2d 44 (1981). 
The majority assumed both that Terry principles could be ap-
plied to justify a warrantless seizure of baggage on less than 
probable cause and that reasonable suspicion existed to jus-
tify the investigatory stop of Place. The majority concluded, 
however, that the prolonged seizure of Place's baggage ex-
ceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative 
stop and consequently amounted to a seizure without proba-
ble cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. -- (1982), and now 
affirm. 
II 
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." (Emphasis 
added.) Although in the context of personal property, and 
particularly containers, the Fourth Amendment challenge is 
typically to the subsequent search of the container rather 
than to its initial seizure by the authorities, our cases reveal 
some general principles regarding seizures. In the ordinary 
case, the Court has viewed a seizure of personal property as 
per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial 
warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describ-
ing the items to be seized. 2 See, e. g., Marron v. United 
States, 275 U. S. 192, 196 (1927). Where law enforcement 
authorities have probable cause to believe that a container 
2 The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that "no War-
rants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized." 
81-1617-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. PLACE 5 
holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have not secured. 
a warrant, the Court has interpreted the Amendment to per-
mit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to 
examine its contents, if the exigencies of the circumstances 
demand it. See, e. g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 
761 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977). 3 
In this case, the Government asks us to recognize the 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of warrantless 
seizures of personal luggage from the custody of the owner on 
the basis of less than probable cause, for the p~~ose ?f pur-
suing a limited course of investigation, short of~, that 
would quickly confirm or dispel the authorities' suspicion. 
Specifically, we are asked to extend the principles of Terry v. 
Ohio, supra, to permit such seizures on the basis of reason-
able, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, that 
the luggage contains contraband or evidence of a crime. In 
our view, such an extension is appropriate. 4 
In Terry the Court first recognized "the narrow authority 
of police officers who suspect criminal activity to make lim-
ited intrusions on an individual's personal security based on 
8 In Sanders, the Court explained: 
"The police acted properly-indeed commendably-in apprehending re-
spondent and his luggage. They had ample probable cause to believe that 
respondent's green suitcase contained marihuana. . . . Having probable 
cause to believe that contraband was being driven away in the taxi, the 
police were justified in stopping the vehicle ... and seizing the suitcase 
they suspected contained contraband." 442 U. S., at 761. 
The Court went on to hold that the police violated the Fourth Amendment 
in immediately searching the luggage rather than first obtaining a warrant 
authorizing the search. I d., at 766. That holding was not affected by our 
recent decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, -- (1982). 
'We note "that an officer's authority to possess a package is distinct 
from his authority to examine its contents." Walter v. United States, 447 
U. S. 649, 654 (1980) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (footnote omitted). Re-
spondent Place has not contended that the exposure of his luggage to the 
trained narcotics detection dog constitutes an unlawful search, and that 
question is not before us. See n. 1, supra. 
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less than probable cause." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 
692, 698 (1981). In approving the limited search for weap-
ons, or "frisk," of an individual the police reasonably believed 
to be armed and dangerous, the Court implicitly acknowl-
edged the authority of the police to make a forcible stop of a 
person when the officer has reaonable, articulable suspicion 
that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in 
criminal activity. 392 U. S., at 22. 5 That implicit proposi-
tion was embraced openly in Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 
143, 146 (1972), where the Court relied on Terry to hold that 
the police officer lawfully made a forcible stop of the suspect 
to investigate an informant's tip that the suspect was carry-
ing narcotics and a concealed weapon. See also Michigan v. 
Summers, supra (limited detention of occupants while au-
thorities search premises pursuant to valid search warrant); 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 (1981) (stop near bor-
der of vehicle suspected of transporting illegal aliens); Penn-
sylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam) (order 
to get out oflawfully stopped car); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) (brief investigative stop near bor-
der for questioning about citizenship and immigration 
status). 
The exception to the probable-cause requirement for lim-
ited seizures of the person recognized in Terry and its prog-
eny rests on a balancing of the competing interests to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved. We 
must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 
• In his concurring opinion in Terry, Justice Harlan made this logical un-
derpinning of the Court's Fourth Amendment holding clear: 
"In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer 
during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitu-
tional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. . . . I 
would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case depends 
upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected 
crime." 392 U. S., at 32-33 (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
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individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the impor-
tance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the in-
trusion. Only when the ture and extent of the detention 
are minimally intrusive of he individual's Fourth Amend-
ment interests can the opposing law enforcement interests 
support a seizure based on less than probable cause. 
We examine first the governmental interest offered as a 
justification for a brief seizure of luggage from the suspect's 
custody for the purpose of pursuing a limited course of inves-
tigation. The Government contends that, where the au-
thorities possess specific and articulable facts warranting a 
reasonable belief that a traveler's luggage contains narcotics, 
the governmental interest in seizing the luggage briefly to 
pursue further investigation is substantial. We agree. As 
observed in United States v. Mendenhall, "[t]he public has a 
compelling inter in detecting those who would traffic in 
deadly d or ers nal profit." 446 U. S. 544, 561 (1980) 
(opinion f Po EL , J.). 
Respon ent ggests that, absent some special law en-
forcement interest such as officer safety, a generalized inter-
est in law enforcement cannot justify an intrusion on an indi-
vidual's Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of 
probable cause. Our prior cases, however, have rejected the 
suggestion that "the presence of some governmental interest 
independent of the ordinary interest in investigating crimes 
and apprehending suspects" is necessary to justify an intru-
sion based only on reasonable suspicion, Michigan v. Sum-
mers, 452 U. S., at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 6 Indeed, 
6 In Michigan, we concluded that "the legitimate law enforcement inter-
est in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found," 
in "minimizing the risk of harm" both to the officers and the occupants, and 
in "the orderly completion of the search" justified a limited detention of the 
occupants of the premises during execution of a valid search warrant for 
the premises. 452 U. S., at 702-703. 
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in Terry itself, we acknowledged that the initial seizure of the 
person, as opposed to the subsequent frisk, was justified by 
the general interest in "effective crime prevention and detec-
tion." 392 U. S., at 22. 7 
Even if it were incumbent upon the Government to "dem-
onstrate an important purpose beyond the normal goals of 
criminal investigation, or . . . an extraordinary obstacle to 
such investigation," Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. at 
708 (Stewart, J., dissenting), we think that burden would be 
met here. 
"Much of the drug traffic is highly organized and con-
ducted by sophisticated criminal syndicates. The prof-
its are enormous. And many drugs . . . may be easily 
concealed. As a result, the obstacles to detection of ille-
gal conduct may be u e · any other area of law 
enforcement." U ed States v. denhall, 446 U. S., 
at 561-562 (opi . n of POWELL, J.). 
Particularly in the c text of airport su veillance, police must 
make rapid, on-the-s ot responses t suspected criminal be-
havior if they are to pr nt the of narcotics into distri-
bution channels. 
Against this strong public interest, we must weigh the 
general nature and extent of the intrusion on the individual's 
Fourth Amendment rights when the police briefly seize his 
7 "[l]t is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer 
may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a 
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even 
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S., at 22. 
8 "The special need for flexibility in uncovering illicit drug couriers is 
hardly debatable. Surely the problem is as serious, and as intractable, as 
the problem of illegal immigration, discussed in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U. S., at 878--879, and in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U. S., at 552." Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. --, -- (1983) (BLACK-
MUN, J., dissenting). 
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luggage for limited investigative purposes. On this point, 
respondent Place urges that the rationale for a Terry stop of 
the person is wholly inapplicable to investigative detentions 
of personalty. Specifically, the Terry exception to the prob-
able-cause requirement is premised on the notion that a 
Terry-type stop of the person is substantially less intrusiv~of 
a person's liberty interests than a formal arrest. In the 
property context, however, Place urges, there are no de-
grees of intrusion. Once the owner's property is seized, the 
dispossession is absolute. 
We disagree. The intrusion on possessory interests occa-
sioned by a seizure of one's personal effects can vary both in 
its nature and extent. The seizure may be made after the 
owner has relinquished control of the property to a third 
party or, as here, from the immediate custody and control of 
the owner. 9 Moreover, the police may confine their investi-
gation to an on-the-spot inquiry-for example, immediate ex-
posure of the luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog 10-
9 One need only compare the facts of this case with those in United . 
States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). There the defendant had 
voluntarily relinquished two packages of coins to the postal authorities. 
Several facts aroused the suspicion of the postal officials, who detained the 
packages, without searching them, for about 29 hours while certain lines of 
inquiry were pursued. The information obtained during this time was suf-
ficient to give the authorities probable cause to believe that the packages 
contained counterfeit coins. After obtaining a warrant, the authorities 
opened the packages, found counterfeit coins therein, resealed the pack-
ages and sent them on their way. Expressly limiting its holding to the 
facts of the case, the Court concluded that the 29-hour detention of the 
packages on reasonable suspicion that they contained contraband did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. I d., at 253. 
As one commentator has noted, "Van Leeuwen was an easy case for the 
Court because the defendant was unable to show that the invasion intruded 
upon either a privacy interest in the contents of the packages or a posses-
sory interest in the packages themselves." 3 W. LaFave, Search and Sei-
zure § 9.6, p. 60 (1982 Supp.). 
1° Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. --, -- (1983) (plurality opinion) 
("We agree with the State that [the officers had] adequate grounds for sus-
1 
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or transport the property to another location. Given the fact 
that seizures of property can vary in intrusiveness, some 
brief de e tions of ersonal effects rna be so mi · ly in-
!) trusive of ourth Amendment interests that strong counter-
val ing governmental interests will justify a seizure based 
only on specific articulable facts that the property contains 
contraband or evidence of a crime. 
In sum, we conclude that when an officer's observations 
lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying lug-
gage that contains narcotics, the m-inciples of.Jerry and its 
progeny would permit the officer t~ detain the luggage 
briefly to investigate the circumstances tnat aroused his sus-
p~ provided that the investigative detention is properly 
limited in scope. 
III 
There is no doubt that the agents made a "seizure" of 
Place's luggage for purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
when, following his refusal to consent to a search, the agent 
told Place that he was going to take the luggage to a federal 
judge to secure issuance of a warrant. As we observed in 
Terry, "[t]he manner in which the seizure ... [was] con-
ducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether 
[it was] warranted at all." 392 U. S., at 28. We therefore 
examine whether the agents' conduct in this case was such as 
to place the seizure within the general rule requiring proba-
ble cause for a seizure or within Terry's exception to that 
rule. 
The precise type of detention we confront here is seizure of 
personal luggage from the immediate possession of the sus-
pect for the purpose of arranging exposure to a narcotics de-
tection dog. Particularly in the case of detention of luggage 
pecting Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his 
luggage while they attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in a man-
ner that did not exceed the limits of an investigative detentio . ') (emphasis 
added). ( 
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within the traveler's immediate possession, the police con-
duct intrudes on both the suspect's possessory interest in his 
luggage as well as his libert interest in proceedin with his 
itinerary. uc a seizure e ectlve y restrains the person, 
srnce he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel 
plans in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for its 
return. 11 Therefore, we must reject the Government's sug-
gestion that the point at which probable cause for seizure of 
luggage from the person's presence becomes necessary is 
more distant than in the case of a Terry stop of the person 
himself. The premise of the Government's argument is that 
seizures of property are generally less intrusive than seizures 
of the person. While true in some circumstances, that 
premise is faulty on the facts we address in this case. When 
the police seize luggage from the sus ect's cus ody, we think 
the lnm a wns app 1ca e to investigative detentions of the 
person should deffiiethe permissible scope of an investigative 
de.!_ention of the persorrs lu,S"gage on less than probable cause. 
Unaer th1s standard, it is clear that the police conduct here 
exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative 
stop. 
The length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone 
precludesthe- concTusiOfi that the seizure was reasonable in 
the" absence of probable cause. Although we have recog-
nized the reasonableness of seizures longer than the momen-
tary ones involved in Terry, Adams, and Brignoni-Ponce, 
see Michigan v. Summers, supra, the brevity of the invasion 
of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an impor-
tant factor in determining whether the seizure is so mini-
11 "At least when the authorities do not make it absolutely clear how they 
plan to reunite the suspect and his possessions at some future time and 
place, seizure of the object is tantamount to seizure of the person. This is 
because that person must either remain on the scene or else seemingly sur-
render his effects permanently to the police." 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 9.6, p. 61 (1982 Supp.). 
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mally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion. 
Further, although we decline to adopt any outside time limi-
tation for a Qermissible Terry stop, 12 we have never approved 
a seizure of aperson for the prOlonged 90-mmute period in-
volved fiere and"refUse to do so now. See Dunaway v. New 
f'ork, 442 U. "S. 200 (19'79). We note that the New York 
agents knew the time of Place's scheduled arrival at 
LaGuardia, had ample time to arrange for their additional in-
vestigation at that location, and thereby could have mini-
mized the intrusion on respondent's Fourth Amendment 
interests. 13 
Although the 90-minute detention of respondent's luggage 
is sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable, the violation 
was exacerbated by the failure of the agents to accurately in-
form respondent of the place to which they were transporting 
his luggage, of tlie length of time he might be dispossessed, 
and of what arrangements would be made for return of the 
luggage if the investigation dispelled the suspicion. In 
short, we hold that the detention of respondent's lug age in 
this case went beyon on y possessed by po--
12 Cf. ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.2(1) (1975) 
(recommending a maximum of 20 minutes for a Terry stop). We under-
stand the desirability of providing law enforcement authorities with a clear 
rule to guide their conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a 
rigid time limitation. Such a limit would undermme the equally Important 
need Co allow authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any 
particular situation. Whether the length of the detention impermissibly 
intrudes on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests must take into 
account whether the police diligently pursue a method of investigation that 
will quickly confirm or dispel their suspicion. See 3 W. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 9.2, p. 40 (1978). 
13 Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. --, -- (1983) ("If [trained narcot-
ics detection dogs had been used, Royer and his luggage could have been 
momentarily detained while this investigative procedure was carried 
~'). This course of conduct also would have avoided the further sub-
/ ~~~tial intrusion on respondent's possessory interests caused by the re-
moval of his luggage to another location. 
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lice to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain 
narcotics. 
IV 
We conclude that, under all of the circumstances of this 
case, the seizure of respondent's luggage was unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence 
obtained from the subsequent search of his luggage was inad-
missible, and Place's conviction must be reversed. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is afRmled. 
It i.s so ordmed. --'---
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Dear Sandra: 
May 2, 1983 
/ 
On April 28, I joined your second draft circulated April 14. 
Changes made in your third draft, which I assume were made to 
attract Bill Rehnquist's vote (judging by his immediate joinder 
on April 29) are somewhat disturbing to me. 
I feel, for example, that the first sentence of the first 
full paragraph on page 7 is somewhat out of context from the 
Terry material that immediately preceded your Terry quote. In 
addition, as I read the revision of· page 11, you have shifted 
the departure test to a subjective one. Does this mean that if 
the Government can prove that Place did not determine that it 
was necessary for him to remain with the luggage or otherwise 
disrupt his travel, there is no Fourth Amendment violation? 
Place, of course, in this case left the airport without his 
luggage. Further, the addition of the sentence on page 12 
beginning with "Moreover" focuses upon diligent police proce-
dures. I doubt if the Court has ever held this. In Dunaway, 
there was no bow whatsoever in the direction of diligence. 
If the third draft remains as it is, I withdraw my joinder J1 
and you may record me as concurring only in the result. f( 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUST I CE SANDRA DAY O ' CO NNOR 
.:§nvutttt QJ01trt cf tqt 1!fuiit lt .:§ tatt.il' 
~!Ul'ljingtcn, ~. QJ. 2ll~'!~ 
May 2, 1983 
No. 81-1617 United States v. Place 
Dear Harry, 
I regret that the changes made in my third draft 
were unacceptable to you. I had thought they were not 
inconsistent with the second draft. I am willing to make a 
few more modifications if they will answer your concerns. 
With respect to page 7, it is helpful, I think, to 
refer to the language of the Fourth Amendment in connection 
with describing the balancing standard for justifiying an 
exception to the probable cause requirement. I would be 
willing to delete the first sentence of the first full 
paragraph, and add the following phrase to the end of the 
next sentence, " ... within the meaning of 'the Fourth 
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.'" 
With regard to page 11, it was not my intention to 
shift to a subjective test. Perhaps your concern can be met 
by a return to the following language in the last sentence 
on page 11: 
"Nevertheless, such a seizure can effectively 
restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible 
disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his 
luggage or to arrange for its return • .J.j" 
The addition of the sentence on page 12 beginning 
with "Moreover" also does not represent a new thought that 
appeared for the first time in the third draft. That 
thought previously appeared in footnote 10 of the second 
draft to explain why adoption of a rigid time limitation for 
2. 
permissible Terry stops would not be appropriate. In my 
view, whether the police diligently pursue their 
investigation can affect, in either direction, the 
determination whether the detention was impermissibly long--
i. e., even a relatively short detention might impermissibly 
intrude upon an individual's Fourth Amendment interests if 
the police do not make an effort to confirm or dispel their 
suspicion during that time. In this case, as the opinion 
points out, the police did not make efforts reasonably at 
their disposal to conduct the investigation expeditiously 
and thereby minimize the intrusion on Place's Fourth 
Amendment interests. This factor exacerbates the critical 
fact that the luggage was held for the prolonged 90-minute 
period. 
Although only a plurality opinion, the opinion in 
Florida v. Royer does support the notion that the diligence 
with which the police pursue their investigation is relevant 
to the Fourth Amendment inquiry. There, the opinion notes: 
"an investigative detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop." Slip op. at 9. 
If my explanation and proposed adjustments will 
allay your concerns, I will gladly make the changes. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
1st DRAFT 
Justice Marshall 
Justice Blackmun / 




From: Justice White 
Circulated: ___ IIA_Y_5 _l_9b_J_ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1617 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
RAYMOND J. PLACE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1983] 
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring. 
Dealing first with the legality of the initial seizure of 
Place's luggage, the Court affirms the right of the govern-
ment to seize the luggage without a warrant and on less than 
probable cause, "for the purpose of pursuing a limited course 
of investigation." Ante, at 5. This conclusion would plainly 
be foreclosed if the investigative procedure to be carried out 
was itself illegal or would violate the Fourth Amendment. 1 
I take it, therefore, that the Court is of the view that the 
purpose of the seizure-to carry out a canine sniff-was con-
sistent wit the Fourth Amendment, eith cause theuse 
of g ou d ~ot cons 1 u e a sear erwise impli-
1 In reviewing the reasonableness of investigative detentions, the Court 
has always looked at the purpose to be served by the detention. Whether 
a seizure is lawful when initiated depends both on the existence of reason-
able suspicion and on whether the course of investigation to be pursued 
during the detention is itself lawful. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 
(1963); United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 421 (1981); United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881-882 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 
U. S. 143, 146 (1972). In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), the 
Court held that reasonable suspicion was sufficient to support a detention 
for the purpose of maintaining the status quo during a search of the per-
son's residence pursuant to a valid search warrant. There is little doubt 
that the detention in Summers would not have been considered "reason-
able" if its purpose was to maintain the status quo during an illegal search. 
81-1617-0PINION 
2 UNITED STATES v. PLACE 
cate the Fourth Amendment or because, even if the sniff is a 
search, it is a search that may be carried out on reasonable 
suspicion and without probable cause or a warrant. 
To reach its conclusion that the initial seizure of the lug-
gage was justifiable, the Court must rest on one of these al-
ternative grounds. Since it purports to reserve the question 
of whether the canine sniff is a sears , ante, a n. , 1 must 
be l'foldmg; artnoiign1t aoes not expressly say so, that even if 
a ~h, reasonable sus:e_icion is sufficie!!!- to justify~ 
{ 
agree with that vieW(' aTthough the l:ourt would nave been 
better advised to justify the canine investigation on the 
grounds that the procedure does not itself require reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause or otherwise implicate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The Fourth Amendment "protects people from unreason-
able government intrusions into their legitimate expectations 
of privacy." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7 
(1977). There is a privacy interest in the contents of suit-
cases that is protected by the Fourth Amendment and lug-
gage may not be opened and its contents revealed without 
probable cause and normally without a warrant. But a "ca-
nine sniff'' does not ex ose the contents of a suitcase. --u-Tn-
volves only the outside surface of the luggage, w 1ch is cer-
tainly "knowingly expose[d] to the public," Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967), and the surrounding air 
which is something in which no person has either a posses-
sory or privacy interest. Without intruding on any legiti-
'The possibility that drug-detecting dogs could have been used as a 
means of investigating a suspected drug-courier was also discussed with 
approval in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. -,- (1983) (plurality opin-
ion). Unlike the present case, the use of these specialized canines was not 
involved in that case and there was no opportunity to decide whether their 
use constitutes a search. That issue is presented in this case and the Court 
should not leave a cloud of doubt over the propriety of this investigative 
technique. 
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mate expectation of privacy in the contents of the luggage, a 
"sniff test" provides the authorities with reliable evidence in-
dicating that among the contents of the suitcase there is con-
traband. The Fourth Amendment does not protect a subjec-
tive expectation that one may have that the police will be 
unable, without actually seeing the contents, to garner suffi-
cient evidence to establish probable cause. 
Nor does it protect people against the use of particular de-
vices or investigative methods unless there is an intrusion on 
a legitimate privacy interest. The suggestion that law en-
forcement authorities may only use their own senses, or a de-
vice that enhances their own senses, rather than a "device" 
that replaces their senses is without merit. 3 There is little 
doubt that if the officer could, by sniffing the outer surface of 
a suitcase, smell an odor that he knew from experience was 
that of contraband he would have probable cause, and no one 
would suggest that the officer's sniff constituted a "search" of 
the suitcase. 4 Although drug-couriers may bemoan the fact 
that "man's best friend" has become the narcotics-carrier's 
worst enemy, if a human "sniff'' does not invade any pro-
tected privacy interest, then a dog "sniff'' does not either. 
Given that the particular course of investigation that the 
agents intended to pursue did not itself violate the Fourth 
Amendment and that the agents had reasonable suspicion to 
believe the suitcases contained contraband, the seizure in this 
case was "justified at its inception." Terry v. Ohio, 392 
~
3 The only Court of Appeals that has held a "sniff' of luggage to be a 
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment relied on such a 
distinction. See United States v. Beale, 674 F. 2d. 1327, 1333 (CA9 1982), 
cert. pending, No. 82-674. 
'Although the Court of Appeals in United States v. Beale, supra, found 
that a "dog sniff' of luggage was a "search," it conceded that "[h]ad [the 
detective], .utilizing only his own natural senses, been able to detect the 
odor of controlled substances emanating from [defendant's] suitcase, this 
would not have been a Fourth Amendment intrusion. Id., at 1332. 
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U. S. 1, 20 (1963). The only remaining question is "whether 
it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place." Ibid. It is 
the Government's burden to show that the particular deten-
tion at issue was sufficienty limited in scope and duration. 
Florida v. Rou.er, 460 U. S. -,- (1983) (plurality opin-
ion). Here, the Government argues that the scope and dura-
tion of the detention meet constitutional requirements be-
cause "the agents did not know that they would need a dog to 
search respondent's luggage," Brief for Petitioner 31, and 
that "the paucity of trained drug detecting dogs makes it im-
possible as a practical matter to have a dog waiting whenever 
a suspected drug courier is arriving at an airport." Ibid. 
These asserted justifications do not bespeak necessity or 
expediency. 
Although I am sympathetic to the myriad problems with 
which law enforcement authorities must cope in executing 
their duties, wherever the solution to the Government's 
problems may lie, it is not in sacrificing interests protected 
by the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, I agree with the 
Court that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be 
affirmed. 
mfs 05/05/83 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: United States v. Place, No. 81-1617 
I agree with JUSTICE WHITE's theory that permits the 
Court to consider the legality of a dog sniff. !~so agree that 
it would be a good idea to resolve the issue now, without having 
another argued case. 
JUSTICE WHITE does not make it clear in his concurring 
opinion what he thinks is the appropriate rationale for upholding 
dog sniffs. I think the Court should make clear that such sniffs 
are not "searches" within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Dog --~sniffs do not reveal the contents of the luggage. The dogs are 
trained to reveal only whether a specific type of contraband is 
present. (This rationale will also apply to United States v. 
Jacobsen, No. 82-1167 (validity of chemical field test for nar-
cotics). Perhaps the Court could vacate and remand Jacobsen for 
further consideration in light of Place, thus saving an extra 
oral argument slot.) This is very different from an X-ray, for 
example, which reveals information about all of the contents of a 
suitcase--innocent items and contraband alike. 
It would not be a good idea to hold that dog sniffs are 
searches, but nevertheless permissible on reasonable suspicion. 
First, this would be an unnecessary extension of the Terry ra-
tionale. Terry permits a weapons frisk in view of the strong 
interest in protecting the safety of the officer. But Terry has 
not been used to justify other searches, only seizures. Second, 
this rationale would be an undue limitation on police practice, 
for it would impose a reasonable suspicion requirement before a 
dog sniff can take place. Such a requirement is, of course, no 
problem in a situation such as this, where the police must seize 
the luggage before exposing it to a sniffer dog. But a reason-
able suspicion requirement could prohibit the police from expos-
ing luggage to sniffer dogs while it is in the airlines' custody. 
I do not think it would be wise to foreclose such procedures at 
this point. 
I have drafted a letter to JUSTICE O'CONNOR for your 
consideration. You may wish to add a line saying that you agree 
with JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestions. All three of his suggestions 
are fairly technical, however, so I do not think it is necessary 
for you to express your views. 
1._.;-
SOC-MICHAL-POW Draft Letter to JUSTICE O'CONNOR 
May 5, 1983 
Re: United States v. Place, No. 81-1617 
Dear Sandra: 
I agree with Byron's theory that permits the Court to 
consider the legality of a dog sniff in this case. Once the po-
lice seized the luggage, their only legitimate purpose was to 
expose it to a sniffer dog. Since the legality of the seizure is 
before us, the legality of the officers' purpose is also before 
us. And I agree that it would be a good idea to resolve the 
issue now, without having another argued case. 
In resolving the issue, I would prefer to say that a dog 
sniff of a piece of luggage is not a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment. Dog sniffs do not reveal the contents of 
the luggage. The dogs are trained to reveal only whether a spe-
cific type of contraband is present. This is very different from 
an X-ray, for example, which reveals information about all of the 
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.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
May 5, 1983 
No. 81-1617 United States v. Place 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Byron has circulated a persuasive 
concurring opinion which would address and resolve 
the question of whether the dog sniff is a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
My draft had reserved the question 
because it had not been argued or addressed below. 
I 
I am willing to address the question and to adopt 
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Dear Sandra: 
I approve of your proposal to treat the "dog sniff" 




cc: The Conference 
~upume <!fo-urt o-f iqf ~nittb ~taft.« 
~a-9'1fington, ~. <!f. 20gi.l!~ 
C H A M BE RS OF' 
JU S TICE JOHN PAUL STE VENS 
May 5, 1983 
Re: 81-1617 - United States v. Place 
Dear Sandra: 
Your exchange of corr e spondence with Harry prompted me 
to reread your opinion in this case. I am not troubled by 
the changes on pages 7 and 11 but I do share Harry's concern 
about the added emphasis on diligence on page 12. Perhaps 
you could take the word "must" out of the "Moreover" 
sentence and make it read something like this: 
"Moreover, in assessing the effect of the length 
of the detention, we take into account the 
character of the diligence with which the police 
pursued their investigation." 
My rereading also caused me to recognize three 
minor points that I would like to suggest for your 
consideration. These are all purely suggestions and if 
you find none of them persuasive that is perfectly 
satisfactory with me. 
First, in the last line on page 5 you refer to the 
Government asking us "to extend" the principles of 
Terry and again in the fourth line on page 6 to such an 
"extension." I wonder if you might not want to 
consider substituting the word "construe" on page 5 and 
the words "a construction" on page 6. I actually do 
not believe you are departing from the principle that 
is already implicit in Terry and other decided cases 
and this slight change in wording makes us look a 
little more like judges and a little less like 
lawmakers. 
In footnote 6 on page 8 you indicate that "we have 
observed" whereas you are really quoting a separate 
., . 
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opinion by JUSTICE POWELL. Should you not change it to 
"JUSTICE POWELL has observed"? 
On page 9, it has occurred to me that there is an 
additional response to the argument that even a 
temporary dispossession of property is absolute that 
you may wish to make. It is the obvious but often 
overlooked point that the brief dispossession of a 
locked suitcase involves no invasion of the privacy 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. (My 
concern about the differences between the privacy 
interest and the possessory interest is what took me so 
long in figuring out what to say in Texas v. Brown.) I 
wonder if you might want to insert something like this 
immediately after the words "We disagree" at the outset 
of the second paragraph. 
"It is perfectly clear that a temporary 
dispossession of a locked suitcase involves no 
examination of its contents and therefore no 
invasion of the owner's interest in privacy. See 
Texas v. Brown, STEVENS, J., concurring, slip op., 
at p. 2." 
It may be that you are reluctant to mention the 
interest in privacy because the very reason for the seizure 
of the suitcase is to allow the trained dog to take a sniff 
which itself might be regarded as an intrusion on privacy. 
Implicitly, however, we must be deciding that such a sniff 
is perfectly okay or there would be no point .in allowing the 
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mfs 05/10/83 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: United States v. Place, No. 81-1617 
I have read your draft letter to JUSTICE O'CONNOR in /'...f'l 
this case, and have a modification to suggest.~~
second paragraph, I recommend adding a sentence to the end of the 
first paragraph as follows: 
v~~~ 
I ~ould j~in an opinion saying that a canin7t~ ~ ~ 
su1tcase 1s not a search. ~~ ~  
d-~-
Deleting the second paragraph has two effects. First, you would 
not be tied to all of JUSTICE WHITE's reasoning as to why a ca-
nine sniff of a suitcase is not a search. Second, you would not 
tie a canine sniff of a sui tease to the reasonable suspicion 
standard. 
Although I agree with JUSTICE WHI'rE' s reasoning that 
permits the Court to reach the canine sniff issue, I think there 
are serious conceptual problems with his resolution of the issue. 
He argues, for example, that a person has no privacy interest in 
the air around his luggage. This argument, however, would permit 
a noncanine sniff by a sensitive device that is capable of iden-
tifying all the contents of a suitcase by smell. Despite the 
fact that there are several good points in JUSTICE WHITE's draft, 
I don't think you should give carte blanche to his reasoning. 
Since I do not think a canine sniff is a search (and 
since I think there are five votes to so hold), I do not think it 
... 
is necessary to say what level of suspicion is necessary to jus-
tify such an event if it were a search. In view of your opinion 
in Texas v. Brown, it also seems inappropriate to rush into a new 
exception to the warrant Clause so quickly. Finally, as I ex-
plained in my original memo, a reasonable suspicion requirement 
could well be an unnecessary burden on police practice in these 
"non-search" cases. 
I can understand why you do not want to include such a 
detailed discussion in your letter to JUSTICE 0 'CONNOR. Your 
current draft, with the change I have proposed, will allow her to 
address the issue. It will also allow you to consider what she 




United ~tates v. Place 
Dear Sannra: 
I aqree that a dog sniff is not a search within the 
meaninq of the Fourth Amennment, ann I think we should sav 
so. 
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· LFP/vde 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
,ju.pr.tntt <!fourl of t4t ~b- ,jtaftg 
'Jfufringhtn. ~. QJ. 2!l?J!.,;l 
May 11, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1617, U.S. v. Place 
Dear Byron: 
/ 
If there are four others I could go the whole 
route with your "dog view" in this case and settle 
one issue. This is not an area where argument would 
add anything for me. 
Regards, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM B ER S OF 
~nvrtmt QI•ttttf at tltt ~tb ~tatt.tr 
~Jrhtghtn. ~. <!J. 20b}J!.~ 
.J USTIC E BYRON R . WHITE 
May 12, 1983 
Re: 81-1617 -
United States v. Place 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me. I shall file my 
separate opinion in the unfiled opinion file. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
C H A M BERS O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST 
~upreme <!Jtrurl trf t4e ~nittb ~taftg 
~l:Ullyittgftm.. ~. <If. 20,?J!.~ 
May 13, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1617 United States v. Place 
Dear Sandra: 




cc: The Conference 
17, 1983 
81-1617 United States v. Place 
Dear Sandra: 
~his will reaffirm my join of pour opinion. 
Justice O'Connor 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
' ·I ~' 
,, 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
' c---·· ... 
~as:Jringht~ ~. <!f. 2ll,?Jl.~ 
May 18, 1983 
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CHAMB E RS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLAC KMUN 
;§u.vumt <!ftmrl tlf tltt 'Jlittittb ~f:at.tg 
2M'rullrhtgtctt, ~. <!f. 20,?J!..;l 
Re: No. 81-1617 - United States v. Place 
Dear Sandra: 
June 1 1983 
Because of the changes effected in your drafts subsequent 
to the second, I now formally withdraw my joinder of April 28. 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.§u:vuutt <qo-ud Df tqt 'J!tnittb .§tafts 
~aslyittghm. ~- <q. 21lp'l-~ 
June 1, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1617-United States v~ Place 
Dear Harry: 





CC: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.®upumt QJcurt .of litl' 'J.iittitl'~ .;§taus 
'lnasJrittgtcn. :!B. ~· 2llbl'l-~ 
June 15, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1617-United States v. Place 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
81-1617 u.s. v. Place (Mike) 
soc for Court 
1st draft 4/5/83 
2nd draft 4/14/83 
3rd draft 4/30/83 
4th draft 5/11/83 
5th draft 6/16/83 
Joined by CJ, BRW, TM, LFP, WHR, JPS 
HAB concurring opinion 
1st draft 6/1/83 
Joined by TM 
WJB concurring in the result 
1st draft 6/15/83 
Joined by TM 
